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I. INTRODUCTION
Is Bruce Ackerman a master legal theorist or a scheming politi-
cian? How about a third possibility: mad scientist? A reading of
Professor Ackerman's latest book conjures up each of these images.
We the People: Foundations is both a brilliant, descriptive theory and
a menacing, prescriptive threat to accepted notions of constitutional
change.
Foundations is the first of three volumes in which Ackerman
seeks to excise popularly accepted discontinuities between the Consti-
tution and constitutional law. Conventional legal wisdom views the
Founding and Reconstruction eras (and the Lochner era) as uniquely
tainted, and views the New Deal as constitutionally unoriginal.1  We
the People seeks to alter the status of each of these events, redeeming
Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University.
• LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1992; J.D., New York Law School, 1989; B.S., Rutgers
University, 1986. The author thanks Sanford Levinson for comments on earlier drafts of this
essay.
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the tainted moments, and according the New Deal a more inventive
place in our constitutional heritage. Ackerman attempts to embed
these events deeper in that heritage than mere attachments to superfi-
cial legalities would permit. Specifically, Ackerman uses the federalist
political science he terms "dualism" to explain these events. Accord-
ing to dualism, the citizenry wears two political hats. Constitutional
law is higher law, created during moments when the citizenry sacri-
fices its private affairs to seriously deliberate on issues affecting the
public welfare. By contrast, representatives perform the normal law-
making function, while the citizenry attends to its private pursuits.2
The most significant implications of Ackerman's project flow
from the premise that constitutional law is the product of dualism's
higher lawmaking track. First, the background principles of popular
sovereignty underlying dualism replace the formalities of constitu-
tional lawmaking, such as the limits on the Philadelphia Convention
of 1787' and the rules of amendment set forth in Article V.4 Second,
the practical result of the first point is to legitimize or at least explain
constitutional changes occurring outside of the formal processes.
Third, the instability raised by the second point calls for the redevel-
opment of formalities. Parts II and III provide an internal descrip-
tion and critique of Foundations and consider these implications in
greater detail. Part IV offers an external critique focusing on issues of
federalism marginalized by Ackerman's theory.
II. THE END OF FORMALITIES: GETTING A GRIP ON POLITICAL
CHANGE
Determining what constitutes "law" requires a standard of mea-
surement. Personal opinions are not law, and, without dissemination,
are unlikely to become law. Widely held opinions may be law, and
almost certainly will be law, if they satisfy accepted standards of polit-
2. Id. at 6-7. The people of the United States are thus "private citizens," with the
emphasis sometimes on "private" and sometimes on "citizens." Id. at 243.
3. The Framers were commissioned to revise the Articles of Confederation, which
forbade "any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of [the Articles of Confederation];
unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards
confirmed by the Legislatures of every State." U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. XIII.
Ackerman's analysis tends to undermine the awe-inspiring mystique surrounding the Framers
and their role.
4. U.S. CONST. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress.").
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ical agreement (for example, a majority vote of both Houses of Con-
gress and signature by the President). Thus, different models of
lawmaking exist on a spectrum from general theories of consensus to
specific and rigorous procedural requirements.
Broad theories of political establishment, exemplified by political
philosophers such as Antonio Gramsci, occupy the most general end
of the spectrum. In this context, the gradual, hegemonic persuasion
of the body politic to adopt a certain political ideology creates or
forms the law.- The actual beliefs of real people predominate over
formalities. For example, one can identify the establishment of a new
legal regime in the former Soviet Union by the free market ethic, or
softer version of socialism, now popularly accepted as the economic
model. Practically speaking, however, vague descriptions of legal
conception are unsatisfying. Taking the temperature of the body poli-
tic may amuse political scientists, but few consider it the appropriate
yardstick by which judges should decide what constitutes law.
Quasi-technical equations that attempt to objectively define the
conditions triggering lawmaking comprise the most specific standards
for determining the formation of higher law. These include the condi-
tions established by the Articles of Confederation for their amend-
ment,6 the constitutional amendment procedures of Article V,7 and
the supplemental procedure that Ackerman offers as a proposed
amendment to Article V itselfA Interpretation of such "specific" and
"objective" provisions has generated dispute,9 but these disputes
5. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCI 59 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey N. Smith eds. & trans., 1971) ("[T]here can, and
indeed must, be hegemonic activity even before the rise to power, and.., one should not count
only on the material force which power gives in order to exercise an effective leadership."); see
also JOHN ADAMS: A BIOGRAPHY IN HIS OWN WORDS 80 (James B. Peabody ed., 1973)
(Adams wrote that "[t]he Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution
was in the minds and hearts of the people .... [t]his radical change in the principles, opinions,
sentiments, and affections of the people was the real American Revolution."); Michael
Oakeshott, POLITICAL EDUCATION (1977), reprinted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 219,
230 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) ("In politics . . . every enterprise is a consequential
enterprise, the pursuit, not of a dream, or of a general principle, but of an intimation."); 1
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 436 (Phillips Bradley ed. & Francis
Bower trans., Vintage Books 1945) (1835) ("[R]epublican notions insinuate themselves into all
the ideas, opinions, and habits of the Americans and are formally recognized by the laws; and
before the laws could be altered, the whole community must be revolutionized.").
6. See supra note 3.
7. See supra note 4.
8. See infra text accompanying note 66.
9. As with most constitutional provisions, legal commentators have built an entire
cottage industry around the interpretation of Article V. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, The
Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979)
(discussing the power of Congress to limit the scope of constitutional conventions under
Article V); Grover Rees III, Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal
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remain narrow and legalistic in comparison to those arising in the
context of less specific standards.
Ackerman's dualist theory occupies a middle range on the spec-
trum of lawmaking standards. By characterizing higher lawmaking
as the product of a citizenry acting on rare occasions to define or
redefine the basic principles of its association, Ackerman departs from
the vagaries of political hegemony theories. He takes a further step
toward specificity in defining four stages in the adoption of higher
law. First, the proponents of change must signal their attempt to
redefine fundamental principles by obtaining a threshold level of sup-
port. Second, some formal proposal must define the contours of the
change. Third, mobilized popular deliberation must surround the
proposal. Finally, when adopted, the decision must be codified, or
made specific in its form and application.'0 These standards are far
more specific than a political hegemony standard. Nevertheless, there
is reason to question how effectively they constrain the formation of
higher law. Part III demonstrates the reason for concern.
Ackerman's analysis challenges us to consider the possibility that
"We the People" have already adopted higher law through his
medium specificity standards, despite the likelihood that We did not
consciously decide to set aside, as non-exclusive, the narrower, spe-
cific standards of Article V. Conventional legal wisdom informs us
that Article V neatly prescribes the avenues by which to amend the
Constitution, and that conversely, an act or decision not following
from the existing Constitution or not sanctioned by an Article V
amendment is constitutionally unsound. Foundations requires us to
consider whether the conventional wisdom accurately describes our
higher lawmaking principles, or perhaps more importantly, our
higher lawmaking practices.
III. THE OPENING OF THE FLOODGATES
Ackerman's ideas form part of a burgeoning legal scholarship
devoted to theories of constitutional amendment, and in particular a
part of that scholarship that views the highest American political
principles as stemming from popular sovereignty, not the Constitu-
Rights Amendment Extension, 58 TEX. L. REV. 875 (1980) (questioning Congress' "plenary"
power to regulate the amendment process by simple majority); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment,
A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of A Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 433 (1983) (arguing for the development of principles of balanced judicial restraint in
reviewing the amendment process); John R. Vile, Limitations on the Constitutional Amending
Process, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 373, 373-74 (1985) (suggesting a conservative approach to
the amendment process).
10. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 266-67.
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tion. The ever-burning embers of the inalienable "Right of the People
to alter or to abolish"'I their government inform and channel these
theories of amendment.
Principal among populist amendment theories is the work of
Professor Akhil Reed Amar. Like Ackerman, Amar finds principles
of constitutional formation and transformation in federalist political
science. 12 Amar's project, however, does not culminate in the devel-
opment of sophisticated stages through which every amendment must
pass. Instead, Amar closely adheres to the notion of popular sover-
eignty and views the test for higher lawmaking as purely
majoritarian.13 National referenda become a plausible amendment
mechanism. '4
Needless to say, boldly majoritarian schemes like Amar's do not
square with the formalistic, supermajoritarian modes of higher law-
making in Article V. Ackerman's ideas also depart from Article V's
strictures, and Foundations raises two important constitutional issues.
First, leaving aside the text of Article V, what do we really do in
practice? Can we account for every constitutional change with a cor-
responding constitutional amendment? If not, what principles, if any,
describe the real process? Second, if Article V does not adequately
account for our constitutional practices, then perhaps we should align
our practices with Article V, or amend Article V to accommodate our
practices.
A. Our Heretical Past?
Sanford Levinson posed the intriguing question of how many
times we have amended the Constitution.'5 It is not mere sophistry to
say that counting to twenty-six or twenty-seven leaves something to
be desired. Three examples illustrate the truly baffling difficulties
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Although the
Declaration is the most familiar incarnation of the idea, American history is rife with other
examples. For compendia, see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 275-78 (1961) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 440 n.12
(1950) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. See Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article
V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1049-50 (1988) ("Federalist supporters of the Constitution had a
knock-down rejoinder [to the Anti-Federalist charge of illegality], a rejoinder that we have all
but forgotten today .... [This was s]imply that the People were sovereign ... .
13. Id. at 1103.
14. Amar realizes that the need to assure deliberation may limit the usage of referenda.
Id. at 1066 ("My own tentative view is that, since the amending majority must be deliberative,
a convention may well be necessary for both the proposing and ratification stages.").
15. Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has
the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) >26; (D) all of the above),
8 CONST. COMMENTARY 409 (1991).
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with that simple answer. First, one can characterize some amend-
ments as unnecessary or superfluous in light of the scope of the fed-
eral legislative power. Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment may have
been rendered unnecessary by the fact that federal legislation could
have accomplished the same result,' 6 just as limited legislative power
may have rendered the Bill of Rights superfluous.' 7 Second, extra-
textual changes may eclipse textual amendments in significance.
Without question, the twentieth century shift in the federal commerce
power and the erection of the welfare state apparatus outstrip quarter-
ing of soldiers' 8 in constitutional significance. Third, the assumption
that all twenty-six numbered amendments actually satisfied Article V
is subject to doubt. Powerful arguments suggest that we have adopted
constitutional amendments without adhering to the formalities of
Article V, either by utterly ignoring the Article V process' 9 or by cer-
tifying amendments under Article V that in fact failed.2" This carries
serious implications for the legitimacy of the Constitution.
If indeed we have spurned Article V, we may face a difficult
choice between repenting for our violation of Article V and continu-
ing to politicize the Constitution. Ackerman permits us a third
choice, allowing us to continue our practices without guilt: Article V
does not provide the exclusive avenue by which the People express
themselves in higher lawmaking. In this manner, We the People
achieve a constitutional catharsis.
16. Id. at 426.
17. Id. at 423-26.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
19. This is an identifying feature of Ackerman's theory of amendment, which accords
legitimacy to the New Deal and to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments through
processes based on the separation of powers, rather than Article V. ACKERMAN, supra note 1,
at 45-47.
20. Those who agree with Ackerman's skepticism about the procedural regularity of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, but disagree with his redemptive theory, would
prefer this characterization. See infra note 77.
Less compelling, but somewhat entertaining, is the challenge to the Sixteenth Amendment
(granting Congress the power to tax income), mounted in the mid-1980s on a number of
technical grounds. See Sisk v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 58, 61 (6th Cir. 1986) (argument for
invalidity based on typographical errors in ratifying resolutions of states, and fraudulent
certification by Secretary of State); United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 462-63 (7th Cir.
1986) (argument for invalidity based on inconsistencies in wording ratified by states), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Knoblauch v. Commissionr, 749 F.2d 200, 201 (5th Cir. 1984)
(argument that Sixteenth Amendment was a" 'nullity' "because "Ohio was not a state when it
ratified the amendment, that William Howard Taft, being from Ohio, was thus not legally
president at the time, and that all laws enacted during Taft's administration are therefore
void"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985). The timing of these challenges, and their
geographical locations, suggests they are connected with the publication in Illinois of a two-
volume manifesto on the subject. BILL BENSON & M.J. "RED" BECKMAN, THE LAW THAT
NEVER WAS: THE FRAUD OF THE 16TH AMENDMENT AND PERSONAL INCOME TAX (1985).
[Vol. 47:267
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This spirit of redemption applies to Ackerman's analysis of the
Founding and Reconstruction eras, and even the Lochner era. It also
applies to his analysis of the New Deal, which he regards as one of
three moments of higher lawmaking in our constitutional history.2 1
Ironically, Ackerman believes that the conventional narrative inter-
prets the New Deal as a constitutional reaction rather than a constitu-
tional revolution.22 For this reason, Ackerman must destroy the New
Deal's legitimacy in order to resurrect it. In other words, his theory
only applies if the changes of the New Deal amount to amendments,
of which there were none in the formal sense. 23 Nevertheless, he con-
fidently proclaims the sins of the New Deal in order to recast it in
sainthood.
B. "In the Corner to my Left - Franklin... Delano ...
Roooosevelt ..... And in the Corner to my Right
Ronald. .. 'the Gipper'. .. Reaaagannnn
As an illustration of how Ackerman's informal, higher lawmak-
ing process works, and as an opportunity to level a few criticisms,
consider how Ackerman characterizes the New Deal and the Reagan
Revolution. According to Ackerman, the New Deal provides a prime
example of a successful extra-textual amendment; the Reagan Revolu-
tion, a prime example of a failure.24 Ackerman measures success and
failure by whether the push for change clears the hurdles of signaling,
proposal, deliberation, and codification.25
With respect to the New Deal, President Roosevelt's call to Con-
gress to pass transformative legislation breaking sharply with prevail-
ing constitutional doctrine constituted signaling. Proposal occurred
when Congress acted on Roosevelt's call and the Supreme Court
rejected the new legislation. Deliberation followed the Supreme
Court's rejection of those laws, when the public decided whether to
re-elect the renegade President and Congress. Finally, codification
proceeded once the Supreme Court gave up its opposition to the other
branches, after rejuvenating electoral victories confirmed popular sup-
21. The Lochner family of cases is treated as a plausible exposition of the existing
Constitution, rather than a departure from it amounting to an amendment. ACKERMAN, supra
note 1, at 43, 63-66.
22. Id. at 42-44.
23. See Levinson, supra note 15, at 430 ("[U]nless one believes that the New Deal cases do
signify amendments, there is literally no need for the complex apparatus of Ackerman's
argument.").
24. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 47-53.
25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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port for the proposals.26
The Reagan administration similarly attempted to rely on a pop-
ular mandate for constitutional reinterpretation. Ackerman believes
this attempt failed because it lacked a sufficient level of popular sup-
port. Thus, in contrast to the New Deal, the Reagan Revolution, at
best, reached the deliberation stage before rejection. 7
Is Ackerman correct, or has he merely constructed a new myth
to replace his perception of the popular one? Several reasons warrant
skepticism of the manner in which Ackerman constitutionally contex-
tualizes political change in the 1930s and 1980s. The remainder of
this Part is devoted to explaining these doubts. Three basic objections
come to mind. First, one questions whether New Deal political events
even satisfy Ackerman's own criteria for extra-textual amendment.
Second, if New Deal changes lacked constitutional legitimacy in the
1930s, one wonders whether long-term acquiescence should rectify
the defect. Third, Ackerman arguably mischaracterizes the degree to
which the Reagan Revolution attempted and failed to achieve consti-
tutional change.
1. SHADY DEAL-INGS
Ackerman himself is uncomfortable with the loose procedure he
believes created the New Deal amendments, although it fits his gen-
eral theory. The New Deal procedure relied heavily on transforma-
tive appointments to the Supreme Court. Ackerman identifies three
corresponding deficiencies. First, debate over Supreme Court
appointments is poorly focused, compared to debate over constitu-
tional amendments.28 Second, reliance on transformative Supreme
Court appointments shifts power too far toward the executive.29
Third, such reliance also shifts power too far away from the States
and into the federal government. 30 Despite these deficiencies, Acker-
man exempts the New Deal from constitutional instability because he
believes that it had the requisite popular support.31
Even under Ackerman's terms, it is far from clear whether the
New Deal really had the requisite support. A truly satisfying answer
would require a rather detailed historical analysis, and may in fact be
unattainable, but a few brief concerns can be raised here. Of the four
stages comprising Ackerman's general theory, the signaling, proposal,
26. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 47-53.
27. Id. at 51.
28. Id at 52-53.
29. Id. at 53-54.
30. Id. at 54.
31. See id. at 53.
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and codification stages present real obstacles to the constitutional
legitimacy-in Ackerman's terms-of the New Deal. 2
Signaling performs two functions. First, it ensures that only
movements having a threshold level of support receive recognition as
contenders for constitutional change. Second, signaling presumes
that a movement openly claims to "come in the name of the People to
demand a fundamental revision of our higher law,"33 and thus ensures
an admission or announcement of the movement's purpose. Constitu-
tional amendments should not be effected by stealth.34
Ackerman explains signaling in terms of the breadth, depth, and
decisiveness of a movement's support. Decisiveness is the most par-
ticular of these requirements: "a proposal... should be in a position
to decisively defeat all the plausible alternatives in a series of pairwise
comparisons-in the terms of the trade, it should be a Condorcet-
winner. ' 35 The question is whether the proposals of the New Deal
were "Condorcet-winners." We might expect some detailed support
for an affirmative answer in Transformations (Volume Two of We the
People), but the task is daunting. Ackerman must prove that electoral
support for victorious 1930s politicians amounted to support for their
unconstitutional proposals-not for their constitutionally
unproblematic proposals or those essentially unrelated to the New
Deal (such as the nation's policy toward Nazi Germany). That is a
full plate.
Assuming the New Deal's specific proposals were Condorcet-
winners, it remains uncertain whether the proposals satisfied the
32. The New Deal political climate arguably could satisfy the popular deliberation
requirement. Possible solutions to the Great Depression and the expanded federal powers of
the New Deal bureaucracy undoubtedly generated a great deal of popular deliberation and
controversy. Even if this might have satisfied the deliberation requirement, a nagging concern
remains over equating statutory and constitutional deliberation. The quality of debate ought
to affect satisfaction of the requirement.
33. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 272 (footnote omitted).
34. It is unclear whether the signaling stage is meant to assure public announcement of
would-be Framers' motives, or whether it just limits access to the amending process by
requiring a threshold of support for a political proposal, without regard to how that proposal is
presented. See id. at 272-80. Ackerman does not explicitly say, but his support for the New
Deal suggests that proposals can satisfy the signaling requirement while couched as normal
legislation. Yet it seems only fair to require candor of would-be Framers. Moreover, the term
"signaling" itself implies the announcement function. So if Ackerman intends otherwise, he
deserves criticism for using an Orwellian appellation.
35. Id. at 277. Marquis de Condorcet, an eighteenth century mathematician and
philosopher, recognized a paradoxical problem in any voting situation involving three or more
voters, and three or more options: "for any option under consideration some majority exists
that would prefer one of the other options." Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson,
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic
Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2129 (1990).
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announcement function of the signaling stage. Proper announcement
would have depended on whether the People of the 1930s realized and
considered the allegedly constitutional proportions of their regular
election choices (perhaps another subject to be addressed in Transfor-
mations). More specifically, the question is whether the public ever
appreciated that repeatedly voting for officials intent on getting their
program of legislation past the Supreme Court amounted to a process
of constitutional amendment. As its most fundamental prerequisite, a
proposal ought to identify itself as a constitutional amendment, even
if it simultaneously announces that it will attempt to use a method
other than Article V. 36 Ackerman correctly notes the importance of
signaling to a legitimate amendment procedure, yet his own exemplar
for extra-textual amendment arguably fails to pass the first stage of his
theory.
The proposal stage is equally troublesome. "Even if a movement
appropriately gains access to a credible signal, it must still define what
it wants to propose in the name of the American people. ' ' a7 What
exactly did President Roosevelt and his Congresses propose? In retro-
spect, was it anything less than plenary federal power over the econ-
omy? Was it more than that?3
At a logical minimum, the proposals must have consisted of
every statute passed by the New Deal Congresses and signed by the
President. Realistically, the proposals should have been understood
as much broader, based on an expectation that the Supreme Court
would develop a theory concerning the general principles reflected by
the specific statutes.3 9 However, the general constitutional principles
that the statutes would eventually represent as a result of judicial
interpretation could not clearly be understood at the proposal stage.
One would expect that such uncertainty would present an epistemic
barrier, preventing the public from forming an opinion on the ulti-
mate significance of a nonexistent, hypothetical amendment. Even if
the public knew that a constitutional amendment hung in the balance,
36. Stated in response to a slightly different argument, "[w]ithout disclosure there can be
no ratification." Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design-A Response to Michael
McConnell, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 67 (1988) (responding to the argument justifying
changed interpretations on the basis of informal popular approval).
37. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 280-81.
38. Apparently so. After the New Deal, "the federal government would operate as a truly
national government, speaking for the People on all matters that sufficiently attracted the
interest of lawmakers in Washington, D.C." Id. at 105.
39. Ackerman explains that while Article V amendments begin with broad textual
principles and are winnowed into specific results through litigation, extra-textual amendments
begin with specific statutes and are stretched into broad principles through litigation. See id. at
283.
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it would be unreasonable to argue that the public would vote to adopt
the amendment without knowing its content or its application.' °
The function of the judiciary in the codification stage raises simi-
lar questions. Codification occurs when the courts issue a series of
landmark opinions defining the meaning of the constitutional trans-
formation.4 Because several New Deal statutes met immediate chal-
lenges, transformative judicial opinions were issued during the period
of popular deliberation.4 2 This idea of codification makes extra-tex-
tual amendments look rather odd, because "amendments" not chal-
lenged and brought before courts would never appear to assume the
status of higher law. Ackerman assures us that "the dynamic of judi-
cial synthesis as it emerges over time" would clarify the "amend-
ment" adopted.43 But we might wish to distinguish between different
sources of judicial exposition. The uncertainty we abide in our tradi-
tionally broad constitutional text does not translate into acceptance of
the far greater uncertainty in having judges draft the new Constitu-
tion as they go along."
Ackerman recognizes that "there is danger involved in the infor-
40. Cf 14 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1987, at 249 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein
eds., 1990) (testimony of Robert Bork). Bork likened the Ninth Amendment to "an
amendment that says 'Congress shall make no' and then there is an ink blot and you cannot
read the rest of it and that is the only copy you have," and explained that he did "not think [a]
court can make up what might be under the ink blot."
41. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 289-90.
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The deliberation and codification stages may blend
together or may be separated by a period of legal inactivity. For the New Deal, "this process
of codification did not end until Roosevelt's third term, when a reconstituted Court
unanimously repudiated central premises of the middle [i.e., Reconstruction to New Deal]
republican regime in a concluding series of transformative opinions." ACKERMAN, supra note
1, at 120 n.*.
43. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 290.
44. There are obvious parallels between the judicial exposition described by Ackerman and
the English tradition of an unwritten constitution, underscoring the tension between his
description and our politics.
Another parallel is even more intriguing. Reflective construction of constitutional
amendments by the judiciary is oddly similar to the practice of hypothetical claim construction
that has arisen in patent law. Enumerated claims appearing at the end of a patent define the
scope of patent protection. Claim drafting is an act of textual precision, because it involves
using words to define intangible intellectual property in technical subject matter. Despite the
emphasis on careful word choice, courts use the equitable doctrine of equivalents effectively to
give claims some scope beyond their literal meaning. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Linde
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-09 (1950). A judge cannot, however, read a claim so
broadly as to encompass prior art-things already known to the public before the patentee's
contribution. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent a fraud on a patent, not to give
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mality of the process by which the New Deal translated constitutional
politics into constitutional law."'45 Nevertheless, the central presump-
tion in Foundations-national popular sovereignty-leads him to con-
clude that the New Deal's popular mandate compensated for its lack
of formality. 6
2. POST-HOC LEGITIMATION
In contrast to his view of the New Deal, Ackerman easily dis-
misses the Reagan Revolution as a failed constitutional moment. Spe-
cifically, he claims that the Reagan administration was rebuffed in its
attempt to revise the constitutional changes effected during the New
Deal.47 Moreover, he claims that Reagan's failure bolstered the legiti-
macy of the New Deal: "the Reagan Republicans only succeeded in
confirming the vitality of the higher lawmaking precedents created by
the Roosevelt Democrats. '48  Unconstitutional governmental prac-
tices, however, are not necessarily constitutional just because they do
not meet with rejection fifty years after their illegitimate adoption.49
A concept used by Ackerman to describe the broadening levels of
generality with which constitutional provisions are interpreted illus-
trates the difficulty of asserting the constitutional legitimacy of the
New Deal by condemning modern attempts to dismantle it. In per-
haps the most poetic moment of Foundations, Ackerman explains that
judges interpret a constitutional event narrowly if they live contempo-
a patentee something which he could not lawfully have obtained from the [Patent and
Trademark Office] had he tried."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1990).
A judge will define the scope of patent protection to which a patentee is entitled by using
the prior art to limit the range of equitable equivalents attributable to the words of a patent
claim. A "hypothetical claim" results-a reflective construction and award by the judge, on
behalf of the patentee, of the greatest amount of protection that the patentee might have gotten
if the patent had been more skillfully drafted. Id. at 684-85. Under Ackerman's amendment
theory, judges similarly award to transformations like the New Deal a scope of
constitutionalization that they would have successfully gained had they only bothered to
follow the usual procedure. Such judicial practices are questionable even in patent law. See
Michael L. Keller & Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Patent Law Developments in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1990, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1157, 1206-08 (1991);
Henrik D. Parker, Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods: The'
Hypothetical Claim Hydra, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N Q.J. 262, 288 (1990). Positing
such practices as norms of constitutional lawmaking should cause at least as much concern.
45. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 284.
46. Id. at 105 ("[W]ith the New Deal, this Founding principle [of limited national powers]
was decisively repudiated.").
47. Id. at 51 ("Reagan transparently failed to convince a decisive majority of Americans to
support his radical critique of the welfare state premises inherited from the New Deal... [and]
saw his constitutional ambitions rejected in the battle precipitated by his nomination of Robert
Bork.").
48. Id. at 50.
49. Cf Berger, supra note 36, at 67 ("Usurpation is not legitimated by repetition.").
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raneously with it, and broadly if they have only second-hand knowl-
edge of it. Ackerman uses the metaphor of a train passing through a
mountain range, with each mountain representing a constitutional
event. Judges seated in the caboose have a broad background picture
of far-away events, and a more personal and specific view of nearby
ones.5" The very distance of the past, in this case the New Deal,
means that judges know that past only by the settled assumptions that
dominate the professional narrative of their training. Judges question
neither the assumed illegitimacy of the Lochner era, nor the assumed
legitimacy of the New Deal.
Should that interpretive status quo be accorded the same validity
as the constitutional text itself?51 Ackerman leaves judges, and the
people in general, open to political temptation from an executive
using the power of the pulpit to effect unconstitutional change. If the
New Deal were unconstitutional in the 1930s, but legitimate today
based on settled acceptance, usurpation of authority would be justified
as long as adequate social acceptance followed at some point in the
future. The underlying theory of political change would shift from
one that focuses on textual authorities like the Constitution to one
that focuses on political hegemony.52 Under such a view, the effective
adoption of the New Deal may have occurred sometime after the
1930s, at a point when Roosevelt's revolution became sufficiently
entrenched to be considered constitutionally secure.
This notion is troubling. It is one thing to take a judicially con-
servative position regarding stare decisis, allowing incorrect constitu-
tional judgments to stand, because of concern for stability and
continuity. 53 It is quite another thing to leap to the conclusion that
incorrect judgments can acquire the same force as correct judg-
ments-and indeed the same status as textual amendments. The pos-
sibility of confining precedent may well provide the greatest respite
that a conservative can find from the competing notions of originalism
50. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 98-99.
51. For the "originalist" perspective, see Edwin Meese, III, The Law of the Constitution,
61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). The text is sacred to Meese, but of course the political right has
an incentive to undermine post-New Deal decisional law, just as the left has an incentive to
protect it.
52. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 760 (1988) (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)). Robert Bork, another representative of the conservative position,
maintains that the New Deal, and therefore the modem regulatory state, is unconstitutional as
an original matter, but simultaneously refrains from invalidating it. See ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158 (1990).
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and precedent.54 Ackerman eradicates even that possibility, by trans-
forming precedent into the Constitution itself.
A contradiction inheres in the fact that Ackerman's theory is
based on popular sovereignty, yet for purposes of constitutional
amendment, relegates the People to a subordinate role. Amendments
are proposed in Washington, D.C., and the People act as rejecters
rather than ratifiers. The threat lies in the potential adoption of con-
stitutional amendments by the inaction of an approving, apathetic, or
perhaps ignorant People. Predictably, the Ackermanian counterargu-
ment states: "But the People are what generated the amendment in
the first place-didn't you read the bit about signaling and proposal?"
This argument, however, is unsatisfying in light of Ackerman's own
criticism of "monistic democrats" like John Hart Ely. 5" Federal poli-
ticians are not the People,56 and Ackerman provides no convincing
reason for considering them so in lopsided federal election years.
Avoiding this tangled web is one of the attractions of the modem pro-
fessional narrative criticized by Ackerman. 7 By telling ourselves that
the meaning, or even a meaning, of the Commerce Clause truly
encompasses broad national power, we avoid the duty to explain why
an abuse of that clause during the New Deal can become acceptable
through the passage of time.
3. GRADING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION
Ackerman's assessment of the constitutional significance of the
Reagan Revolution is doubtful as well. By relying on one failed
appointment (that of Robert Bork), Ackerman may grossly underesti-
mate the quality of the revolution he denies. The Reagan judiciary
has already had a tremendous effect on constitutional law, although
the crown jewels of the New Deal may well remain intact.5 8 Acker-
man's assertion that "rather than gaining the consent of the Senate to
a series of transformative Supreme Court appointments, the President
54. According to Bork, judges have more leeway in confining the future effect of less well-
settled precedents. BORK, supra note 53, at 158-59.
55. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 7-10.
56. See id. at 181-83 (treating politicians as the People would be a "naive synecdoche" and
"misplaced ... reification"); id. at 260 (politicians are "just stand-ins" for the People).
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. Ackerman cites no serious Reaganite challenge to the constitutionality of the New
Deal. The best account of Reaganite litigation strategy confirms the timidity of the threat
posed to the New Deal by the "conservative revolution" of the 1980s. CHARLES FRIED,
ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 158-60
(1991) (recounting the hesitance toward, and abandonment of, challenges to the
constitutionality of independent agencies). The most explicit challenges by the Reagan
administration to the national regulatory state remained a matter of normal politics and not
constitutional law.
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saw his constitutional ambitions rejected" with the failure of the Bork
nomination simply does not jibe with reality. 9 By a series of trans-
formative appointments, the conservative wing of the judiciary now
dominates the Supreme Court (and the federal courts in general),
regardless of the failed Bork nomination.
The foregoing criticisms illustrate that Ackerman's general the-
ory better serves to explain or describe, rather than justify or pre-
scribe. Foundations provides easy reading, if one accepts the
argument as a new way of understanding constitutional changes in a
politically general sense, as opposed to a legal sense. Ackerman, how-
ever, seems to want to write a better brief, as well as tell a better story.
Yet it remains difficult to assess exactly what Ackerman intends for
his theory-to provide an objective description of constitutional prac-
tice, or to "manipulate[ ] his criteria of higher lawmaking rules to
validate those quasi-constitutional moments of which he approves
(specifically, the New Deal), and to screen out others that he does not
(such as the Reagan Revolution)."'  If his general theory only
describes how political change-as opposed to legitimate constitu-
tional change-occurs, then the New Deal is no safer in 1991 than
Allgeyer v. Louisiana" was in 1937. However, if his theory defines
legitimate constitutional change-an extra-textual amendment pro-
cess-then he must accept such change in the future. Can Ackerman
reconcile the desire for certainty in constitutional moments with the
apparent legitimacy with which he cloaks some extra-textual
amendments?
4. A DEFENSE-AND COUNTERATIACK
The syllogistic argument against the constitutionality of the New
Deal states that it amounts to a constitutional amendment; constitu-
tional amendments must follow Article V; the New Deal failed to
qualify as an Article V amendment; and therefore, the New Deal is
unconstitutional. Foundations provides a thesis for refuting the sec-
ond of these propositions. It is not necessarily a radical departure
from Article V, though; the installment of the New Deal may have
occurred through a course of events that, for all practical purposes,
was equivalent to an Article V amendment process.
To understand this assertion, consider that Ackerman's theory is
based on an abstraction of basic ideas and categories already inherent
in Article V. The requirements of Ackermanian amendment dutifully
59. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 51.
60. Amar, supra note 12, at 1093.
61. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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encompass the formal amendment procedure of Article V: signaling
occurs in the call for a congressional proposal or constitutional con-
vention; proposals are made by Congress or a convention; deliberation
takes place in State legislatures or conventions (and in the public that
watches such proceedings carefully); and codification inheres in the
specific text ratified and in judicial opinions defining the practical
meaning of the text. Article V thus meets all of the criteria of his
general theory.
The troubling aspect of the theory lies not in the fact that Article
V satisfies the four stages, but that many other procedures do as well.
By translating the standards for amendment from those of Article V
to a set of abstract categories, Ackerman opens up a new world of
extra-textual amendment possibilities. A strict constructionist might
stop at this point, recalling the observation of Justice Black that
"[o]ne of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words
of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less
flexible and more or less restricted in meaning."'62
Nevertheless, even Justice Black enlisted maxims accurately rep-
resenting constitutional values. 63 Admittedly, abstraction of Article
V values carries the danger of abuse, simply because abstractions are
broader than specifics. However, the damage can be controlled by
responsible application of the abstractions; no harm would be done if
the broad theory were applied only in cases where an amendment
would succeed under Article V anyway. The problem is that if Ack-
erman's theory fails to legitimate amendments with insufficient sup-
port to satisfy Article V, then it makes no difference.M If anything his
theory subverts the written Constitution.
Perhaps his theory serves to avoid cluttering the Constitution
with exceptions. More specifically, extraordinary popular support
might justify an otherwise radical interpretation of the Constitution-
sort of a popular incursion into constitutional interpretation that lays
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). In spite of
the vagaries of Article V, see supra note 9, the procedures envisioned by Ackerman certainly
stretch beyond its bounds.
63. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Our
insistence on 'a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and impregnable' has
seemed to some a correct exposition of the philosophy and a true interpretation of the language
of the First Amendment to which we should strictly adhere .... I mean ... to reaffirm my
faith in [that] fundamental philosophy . . ... ") (footnote omitted); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest
breach.").
64. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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a foundation for subsequent judicial activism. Thus, if the New Deal
constituted only a collection of discrete programs, we might want to
exempt it from scrutiny because it received popular support
equivalent to that of an Article V amendment. That is not, however,
the nature of the beast. The New Deal was neither discrete nor excep-
tional, but pervasive and foundational. Recent examples of the limit-
less assertion of national authority over former state concerns include
the death penalty and sports gambling 65-matters that Ackerman can
never depict as foremost in the minds of Depression-era voters.
B. Prescription: A Dose of Certainty
Ackerman recognizes the uncertainty of amendment according
to his general theory, and offers his own more limited amendment
procedure for the future. His procedure operates by presidential pro-
posal, Congressional consent by a two-thirds vote, and popular ratifi-
cation by a three-fifths vote at two consecutive presidential
elections 66 -a procedure more definite than his general theory. In
fact, Ackerman's procedure is even more specific than Article V,
which has more decisional paths and actors.67 This attention to the
need for certainty undermines change by the generalized procedure he
spends most of Foundations discussing.
Recalling the earlier discussion of law and political change,6"
determination of the law at any given moment requires identifying a
change from an initial legal condition in the past to a subsequent legal
condition in the present. 69 This requires a standard for recognizing a
65. One bill introduced in the recent session of Congress provided a federal death penalty
for killers using guns obtained or transported through interstate commerce. S. 1241, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1211 (1991). The -extremes of national power approach the comical in a
recent law prohibiting sports gambling in any state not permitting it by August 31, 1990.
Professional & Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227 (1992) (to
be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04). No enumerated federal power is invoked by the law as
enacted, but the original bill identified one longstanding federal concern: protection of the
trademarks of professional sports teams. S. 474, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) § 2 ("Congress
finds that sports gambling ... threatens the integrity and character of, and public confidence
in, professional and amateur sports, instills inappropriate values in the Nation's youth,
misappropriates the goodwill and popularity of professional and amateur sports organizations,
and dilutes and tarnishes the service marks of such organizations.").
66. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 54-55.
67. For analyses of some of the disputes that can arise under Article V, see supra note 9.
68. See supra part II.
69. Natural law, if it exists, may provide an exception to this rule. True nature-state
conceptions of natural law presumably reach back at least as far as the existence of humanity,
having no specific time of enactment and constituting eternal truth. Moralistic conceptions of
natural law, on the other hand, may have a theoretical beginning at the time humanity
acquired the capacity to appreciate moral ideas. For example, we do not apply moral
standards to animals lacking such a capacity. Natural law, therefore, may have come into
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new legal condition. Speaking in political terms, one could say that a
new legal condition arises whenever there is a significant shift in
sociopolitical attitudes. At the other end of the spectrum, formalistic
views demand compliance with certain procedures before recognition
of a legal condition as "law." The earlier discussion explained that
the general Ackermanian amendment theory rests somewhere
between these two extremes of the spectrum.70 Accepting the general
theory requires accepting the compromised degree of certainty that it
demands of an act of constitutional creation.
Ackerman's general theory of change does not meet the stan-
dards of specificity that a constitutional amendment process warrants.
First, permitting extra-textual amendments encourages textlessness.
Although some do not find this troubling, many do. Hugo Black,71
Robert Bork,72 Sanford Levinson,73 and countless others have
accorded the text a pivotal place in constitutional deliberation. To
even suggest that unwritten amendments exist evidences the linguistic
gap that Ackerman must close if his theory is to take hold. We the
People only think of amendments as pieces of text and therefore may
find it hard to agree with Ackerman's fast and loose method of
amendment.
Second, Ackerman ironically depends too much on principles of
separation of powers and too little on those of popular sovereignty.
He makes the insightful observation that process-based theories of
constitutional law erroneously attribute the voice of the People to the
legislature, whereas the system of separated powers really ensures that
all three branches can claim to speak for Us while We register our
approval or disapproval in occasional elections.74 The problem with
Ackerman's theory is that a single branch's claim to speak for the
being only when humans became capable of living within that law. One might assert that
morality consists of a historically growing and changing body of commands that cannot be
"enacted" until they are conceived and that they are conceived by people over scattered times
and circumstances. Thus, the existence of these moral commands and the capacity to
appreciate them arise simultaneously because to know is to have responsibility. One could
then understand a body of natural law as comprising numerous, temporally scattered
enactments corresponding to advances in human morality.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
71. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
72. Bork advocates a strict construction of the Constitution which, of course, gives the text
a fundamental position in decision-making.
73. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (1988) (describing constitutional
decision-making in terms of a Protestant ethic of textual authority combined with lay
interpretation and a Catholic ethic of textual plus traditional authority combined with elite
interpretation).
74. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 7-10, 261-63; see also Amar, supra note 12, at 1085
(criticizing "the unjustified assumptions of Ely and Bickel in equating the political branches
with 'the People,' judges with Platonic guardians, and the Constitution with the dead hand....
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People is too easily inflated to constitutional proportions. Any inter-
branch conflict over constitutional law might become the subject of a
referendum at the next election. What would Ackerman say if Robert
Bork had been confirmed? That the New Deal had been overturned?
Transforming interbranch conflicts (which occur with great fre-
quency) into potential constitutional referenda effectively levels con-
stitutional debate. The normal election becomes equivalent to
ratification of a constitutional amendment. Ironically, Ackerman
believes that his approach solves the problem of levelling,75 yet it
appears he is guilty of that sin himself.
Finally, despite the masterful recounting of federalist theory in
Foundations, it is difficult to accept Ackerman's view that principles
surrounding the making of the Constitution support his generalized
amendment procedure. Ackerman makes much of the fact that the
Philadelphia Convention ignored the amendment procedure of the
Articles of Confederation 76 and that the Republican Reconstruction
Congress manipulated the role of the States in ratifying the Four-
teenth Amendment.77 These actions, however, occurred only in con-
junction with highly specific adoption or amendment procedures.
The Philadelphia Convention declared, in what is now Article VII of
the United States Constitution, that ratification by "Conventions of
nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitu-
tion between the States so ratifying the Same."'78 The Reconstruction
Congress went out of its way to mold the South into a condition
whereby ratification by Article Vprocedures could take place. 79 They
did not just invoke principles of dualism or popular sovereignty.
The New Deal, for its part, would have been interesting had it
included a petition signed by a majority of American citizens stating
No branch, or combination of branches, can uniquely claim to speak for the People
themselves.").
75. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1035-36, 1038, 1071-72 (1984).
76. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 41.
77. Id. at 45. Specifically, the issue arises from Congress' inconsistent treatment of the
southern States in passing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Congress counted the
votes of Andrew Johnson's provisional governments in the southern States toward ratification
of the Thirteenth Amendment. WILLIAM A. DUNNING, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 124 (1897). Those same governments, however, opposed the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 120-21. To see its program through, the radical
Republican Congress placed the South under military rule, id. at 123, and "readmitted" the
States only as their reconstructed legislatures accepted, among other things, the Fourteenth
Amendment. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877, at 276 (1988).
78. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
79. See supra note 77.
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that "We the People grant the federal government plenary economic
regulatory authority, effective upon signature of this petition by a
majority of American citizens." Of course, it did not. The point is
that vague standards of amendment like Ackerman's are not needed
to fulfill the promise of popular sovereignty, except for the purpose of
legitimating changes like the New Deal. All other amendments pro-
ceeded according to technical formulae that happily were consistent
with notions of popular sovereignty, but did not surrender specificity.
Ackerman's general theory does surrender specificity and therefore is
undesirable.
One cannot help joining Professor Amar's curiosity 0 about the
parameters chosen by Ackerman for his amended Article V-presi-
dential proposal, congressional consent by a two-thirds vote, and pop-
ular ratification by a three-fifths vote at two consecutive presidential
elections. Has Ackerman calibrated his scale specifically as a post-
hoc justification for the New Deal? Perhaps Volume Two, Transfor-
mations, will demonstrate that Democrats in the 1930s received over
sixty percent of the vote, conveniently legitimizing the New Deal in
retrospect. This is not necessarily unreasonable; we might think
highly of the New Deal, and take its constitutional tribulations into
account in designing a new amendment procedure. Ackerman, how-
ever, has yet to admit this as his motive.
III. UNITED OR STATES?
Bruce Ackerman's proposal for amending Article V not only fea-
tures specificity, but also focuses dramatically upon nationalism and
separation of national powers. By contrast, the Article V amendment
process focuses on division of powers between nation and States. If
Ackerman's proposal ever reaches the stage of mobilized popular
deliberation, then questions of federalism will be at the center of the
debate. His general theory of amendment, which also relies on con-
flict and resolution between branches of the federal government, must
similarly face these questions. The following discussion considers the
consequences of nationalizing the amendment process. The discus-
sion raises two questions. First, what are the consequences of nation-
alization? Second, do We the People think those consequences
desirable?
Article V guarantees the States a decisive role in all amendments
to the federal Constitution. Generally, a national body, consisting of
a convention or two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, proposes
80. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47:267
WHO ARE WE THE PEOPLE
amendments under Article V. Ratification, however, is performed by
"[t]he Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or... Con-
ventions in three fourths thereof.""' By design, Article V mixes
national and State authority as explained by James Madison in The
Federalist No. 39:
If we try the Constitution by ... the authority by which
amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national nor
wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate
authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union
.... Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of
each State ... would be essential to every alteration .... The
mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on
either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and
particularly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens,
it departs from the national and advances toward the federal char-
acter; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number
of States sufficient, it loses again the federal and partakes of the
national character. 82
The significance of Ackerman's proposal lies not in affording the
power of decision to a supermajority of sixty percent rather than sev-
enty-five percent. Instead, the significance lies in the shift in focus
from States to a national people.83 State control over the amendment
81. U.S. CONST. art. V.
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Article V is not idiosyncratic in this respect, but is a microcosm of the greater constitutional
plan:
The proposed Constitution . . .is, in strictness, neither a national nor a
federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal,
not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government
are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these
powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not
national; and, finally in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is
neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
Id.
83. Even his descriptive account of judicial decisions such as Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), smacks of
hostility toward the States. In what I consider to be the weakest analytical section of the
book-bordering on bizarre-Ackerman argues that Brown and Griswold were really the
products of synthesizing, respectively, the Reconstruction with the New Deal on the one hand,
and the Founding with the New Deal on the other. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, ch. 6.
Ackerman asks us to believe that both Brown and Griswold owe their constitutional force to
the New Deal, which, by an expansion of federal powers, somehow elevated the status of both
public education and individual rights. If true, the amendatory fraud perpetrated on the
People (and the States) during the New Deal is of immense and perhaps immeasurable
proportions. I prefer to view Brown as a Reconstruction question and Griswold as a
Founding/Reconstruction question. Call me hidebound.
Ackerman also explains the abandonment of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in
terms of the New Deal amendment procedure. Again, I find it much more satisfying to view
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process is justified by the same parochial reasons underlying numer-
ous other areas in which the Constitution takes cognizance of States
instead of persons. Some of these areas are potentially meaningful,
such as equal representation in the Senate. Some are potentially triv-
ial, such as representation by population in the House of Representa-
tives. Article V is one of the potentially meaningful recognitions of
statehood.
Have we reached a point in American history at which the States
are obsolete entities for purposes of establishing or amending the
national Constitution? Despite its centrality to Ackerman's theory
and proposal, Foundations hardly recognizes the question and does
not attempt to defend its implicit affirmative answer. Such a critical
omission is baffling, because the federalism question is the ultimate
test for this latest incarnation of the national popular sovereignty
principle. In light of world events favoring disunion as often as union,
1992 may be too early to argue for nationalization of sovereignty.
Even without the bias of current events, the continued demand by
People of the States for local sovereignty cannot be ignored. 4 The
case for national popular sovereignty for amendments is hard to make
this shift as a simple reevaluation of Reconstruction. Lochner was no more a constitutional
amendment than Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), was when it opened Act One of
the substantive due process drama. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448 (11 th
ed. 1985).
84. Akhil Amar insists that the original Constitution of 1787 eviscerated State sovereignty,
resulting in our transubstantiation from numerous peoples in the States to a unitary national
People. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426-27, 1519-
20 (1987). His argument relies on the premise that sovereignty is indivisible. Id. at 1430,
1444-45. Because the United States is a sovereign nation, the individual States have no
individual sovereignty. According to Amar, James Madison alone among the Framers
entertained the idea of bifurcated sovereignty-shared sovereignty between States and nation.
Amar, supra note 12, at 1063-64. There is some force to these philosophical underpinnings. In
practical terms, however, Amar's argument is weak and academic. For instance, his
"tempt[ation] ...simply to invoke the Constitution's famous first seven words-'We the
People of the United States'-and be done with it," Amar, supra, at 1450, demonstrates how a
theoretical predisposition can obscure the facts. As originally accepted by the Philadelphia
Convention, the text read "We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia
.... .2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 177 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966). The States present in Convention unanimously passed this version on August 7,
1787. Id. at 193. The shift to "We the People of the United States" appeared in the September
12, 1787 report of the Committee of Style. Id. at 590. The Committee of Style was concerned
with form and conciseness, not content. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy
Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra,
at 419, 420 (Morris, a member of the Committee of Style, wrote that "[h]aving rejected
redundant and equivocal terms, I believed [the Constitution] to be as clear as our language
would permit."); Letter from James Madison to Jared Sparks, in id. at 498, 499 ("The
alterations made by the Committee [of Style] are not recollected. They were not such, as to
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when we have not abandoned the principles of equal state representa-
tion in the Senate and limited national powers.85
Nationalization of the amendment process did not begin with
Bruce Ackerman or Akhil Amar; it is an old idea, and there is no
particular justification for its application in the early 1990s. 6 Per-
haps idealistic advocates like Ackerman and Amar can more elo-
quently state their case than their erstwhile compatriots, but they will
have to contend with continued popular suspicion toward concentra-
tion of power. As the merits and prospects of nationalized amend-
ment processes are cabined by State power, so Ackerman's enterprise
will likely remain confined to academia.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, we must take some position on the status of
impair the merit of the composition."). Although Amar resists his temptation to invoke the
Preamble "and be done with it," Amar, supra, at 1450-51, his capitulation seems half-hearted.
Moreover, by repeating the mantra "sovereignty is indivisible" enough times, Amar
conditions himself to read the constitutional text selectively. Although it may be that
"Articles V and VI [are] logically inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people of each
state," it does not follow that "therefore ... sovereignty must logically be vested in the People
of the United States as a whole," Amar, supra note 12, at 1063, except as assisted by the
bootstraps of impeium in imperio. Textually, it is no less true that Article V and Article I, § 3
are logically inconsistent with the sovereignty of "the People of the United States as a whole."
While admittedly there has been a trend toward concentration of power in the national
government, the expanded reading of the Commerce Clause and the desuetude of the Tenth
Amendment hardly show that States have conceded the sovereignty reflected by their equal
representation in the Senate and in Article V. Even our most national act of sovereignty-the
election of a President-follows procedures tempered by State sovereignty. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XII. Most fundamentally, Amar's proposition flies in the face of reality. We are asked
to believe that an agreement explicitly stating that acceptance and modification are to be
measured by the assent of States actually embodies the principle of unitary national popular
sovereignty. That takes a true believer.
85. These protections were of no mean importance to the People of the States. One of the
Framers went so far as to say that "we would sooner submit to a foreign power, than to submit
to be deprived of an equality of suffrage, in both branches of the legislature, and thereby be
thrown under the domination of the large States." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 84, at 242 n.* (quoting John Dickinson, delegate from
Delaware); see also id. at 322-25. Despite the vast expansion of federal powers during the New
Deal, the principle of limited federal power lives on. Thus, for example, Congress still sees the
need to condition its federal death penalty proposals on the involvement of a firearm that
traveled in interstate commerce. See supra note 65.
86. See Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBLIUS
153, 155 (1987) ("[P]roposals to amend Article V by adding a national referendum procedure
or a national initiative procedure, or both, have not received congressional approval."). May
cites a 1942 book in which the author found that "a popular referendum on amendments
proposed by Congress was the subject of more proposals than any other introduced in
Congress to reform the national amending procedures during the period of his study." Id. at
155 n.9 (citing LESTER B. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrTUTION 192
(1942)).
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profound informal political shifts like the New Deal. If we keep our
faith that the national government acted within the Constitution dur-
ing Reconstruction and the New Deal, then Ackerman is of little use
to us. But to the extent we have our doubts, Ackerman might provide
a way to bridge the gap between constitutional theory and constitu-
tional practice. The issue remains, however, whether his global
rationalization of American constitutional history finally permits us
to accept our sordid past, or whether he confirms that past without a
convincing redemptive resolution. This challenge is well worth
entertaining.
In any event, it is difficult to deny the descriptive force of Acker-
man's presentation, for major changes have indeed taken place in the
manner Ackerman posits. The natural response may be "so what?"
We may just accept the fluidity of constitutional interpretation and
the influence of ordinary politics, ignoring the issue of whether and
when inventive interpretation can become illegitimate amendment.
Ackerman would no doubt respond: Read the book, and decide for
yourself which is the better description-the old dichotomy between
legitimate interpretation and pernicious usurpation of political power,
or instead a glorious constitutional capacity to absorb social change
through extra-textual amendment, thus remaining true to principles
of popular sovereignty. Whatever the conclusion, the striking consti-
tutional discourse presented by Ackerman has already become an
indispensable part of the constitutional scholar's library.
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